The security of several signature schemes and cryptosystems, essentially proposed by Oliamoto, is based on the difficulty of solving polynomial equations or inequations modulo n. The encryption and the decryption of these schemes are very simple when the factorisation of the modulus, a large composite number, is known.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this section, after some definitions, we describe the problems posed by the security of Okamoto schemes, and the partial solutions given by Brickell and Shamir. Then, we state our main results and show how they extend the previous ones.
Definitions and notations
For an odd integer n, Z ( n ) denotes the ring of the integers modulo n which is identified with [0, n -11.
We will use approximations of a number z0 in Z(n). So, we adopt the following definitions and notations:
IuI denotes, for u E Z ( n ) , the minimum of ZL and n -u, I(a,xo) denotes the set of 2 E Z ( n ) such that 2 = 20 +u, Iu[ I na, 
J ( a , z o ) denotes the set of 2 E Z ( n )
such
Okamoto's cryptographic proposals and questions
In this section, the modulus n is particular: n = p 2 q where p and Q are distinct primes ( p < q). An element $0 of Z ( n ) is called easy when it is smaller than (1/2)-modulo pq.
The following cryptographic schemes are based on the difficulty of extracting square roots modulo n, when the factors of n are unknown:
Cryptosystems
In [6], Okamoto proposed a first public key cryptosystem:
The public key is the pair ( n , x o ) , where zo is an easy element of Z ( n ) . From a message u, which is small compared to n, the cipher text y is built as follows:
As quoted in [7] , Shamir [8] has two attacks to break this system: the first one works for any pair (n,zo) while the second one uses the particular form of the public key.
Okamoto [7] then proposed a new cryptosystem: 50 is the known quotient modulo n of two secret easy numbers of Z(n). A message (211, u2), where the u;'s are s m a l l compared to n, gives a cipher text y such that
Okamoto stated as a n open question the breaking of this second system.
We show here that we can break this new cryptosystem without using the particular form of the public key ( n , Q).
Signature Scheme
In Brickell [2] broke this scheme, without using the particular form of n. Now, we state and solve problems which are natural extensions of all the questions that we described above. For a n y n ,~ > 0,a and b reals in [0, 1] satisfying
T w o
there exists an exceptional subset T ( E ) of Z ( n ) such that the following i s true:
ii) For anyzo, not in T ( E ) and any yo in Z ( n ) : intervals J ( a , zo) and I(b, yo) have a t most two compatible pairs, say (2, y) and ( n -x, y).
Moreover, there exists a probabilistic polynomial algorithm A which provides one of the following three answem:
'no compatible couple' (5, y) and ( n -z, y) are the two compatible pairs.
THEOREM 1 BIS.
For any n, E > 0, a and b reals in [ there exists a n exceptional subset T ' ( E ) of Z ( n ) , such that the following is true:
ii) For any ZO, not in T " ( E ) and for any yo in Z ( n ) , intervals I ( a , z o ) and I(b, yo) are compatible.
Moreover, there exists a probabilistic polynomial algorithm C which provides one of the following answers:
a compatible pair (z, y) otherwise.
We give now the proofs of our results, mainly for Theorem 1, in the case of subsets J , and see how our methods work for the intervals I , in the proof of theorems lbis and 2. The main tool is lattices for which there are two basic facts: a) There is a high proportion of lattices with given determinant having their smallest vector not too small. We answer now these two questions.
The ClosePoint Algorithm
We get a reduced basis Q = (QO, q , (~2 ) of M by using the LLL algorithm ti. This algorithm gives the point t nearest to m within a factor K which is analysed in [l] . If n is sufficiently large compared to 1 /~, this factor will be of order n'I3.
The uniqueness problem
Here So, in a such a lattice, we can get our uniqueness result.
The analysis of the lattices M ( z 0 )
Are there many lattices M ( z 0 ) which have their shortest vector not too long ? We have the following answer ([3], [9] )
For any n, E > 0 , for any triple k = (ko, kl, k2) of product 1, there exists an exceptional subset T(E) o f Z ( n ) such that the following is true:
We deduce that we can apply the facts described in 2.3 to most of lattices iLf(z0) provided we choose po = 72(1-2')/3 and also p1 = n1/3--c.
We know also that we can decide whether we are in T ( E ) .
The end of the proof
If (z,y) is a compatible pair in J ( a , z o ) x I ( b , y o ) , we want to find it. This pair (2, y) gives a point w = (uf, u1u2, yo
We now choose the triple k so that all the approximations be bounded We remark that the optimal choice for the pair (a, b) is
Back to the breaking of Okamoto's cryptosystem
Okamoto's second cryptosystem hypotheses are a particular case of ours. He takes a = 2 / 9 , v = 0; we remark that our results indeed allow to decrypt the message y, because most of the 50's used -here, the quotients of two easy numbers-are outside the exceptional set. Furthermore, our algorithm works even if i) the 1/3 of the least sigmficant bits of y are lost ii) the pair (n,zo) has no particular form.
PROOFS OF THEOREM lBIS AND THEOREM 2
Given n , 20, yo, a, b, we must find u, u , that satisfy and that are solutions of the equation
As before, replacing u by 200 and v -u2 by wl, we then have the lattice L(z0) which has for matrix: with determinant n. We also use a second lattice M(zo), with a suitable choice of (ko, kl) and the point rn is now (0, kl(yo -z i ) ) . 
Outline of the proof of Theorem

2)
We have one more property of lattices M(z0) satisfying (3bis), which has to do with existence and not with uniqueness:
If p-2 = nl/'+', the ball B(m, p 2 ) contains at least one point of the lattice. 
Extensions to higher degrees
Most of our uniqueness results can be generalized : a s is shown in [9] , we can recover, in polynomial probabilistic time, roots of polynomial equations of higher degree provided that we are given a suf3ciently good approximation of these roots.
IV. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES
